Sampling and semiotic democracy

Thomas Wuil Joo. A Contrarian View of Copyright: Hip-Hop, Sampling, and Semiotic Democracy. 44 CONN. L. REV. — (2012)

As both a fan and a producer of sample-based music, I’m naturally sympathetic to Lawrence Lessig and the free-culture movement, a group of legal scholars advocating reforms to copyright law that would make it easier to sample, remix and mash up the works of others. The free-culture adherents believe that copyright law exceeded its original purpose to “foster the Useful Arts and Sciences,” and that now it mostly stifles less-powerful creators while benefiting more-powerful entities. A narrative has emerged in this movement implicating the high-profile sampling lawsuits of the 1990s like Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records and Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films in suppressing sample-based hip-hop and related collage-like popular music.

Lessig and company think that sampling and remixing of popular culture can empower us, enabling us to take ownership over the products of the dominant culture industry and enhancing “semiotic democracy.” Copyright law inhibits recoding and is grossly overbalanced in favor of large corporate entities and other powerful actors. In particular, so the narrative goes, marginalized hip-hop artists have suffered under the heavy hand of lawsuits and exorbitant licensing fees.

Is the free-culture movement right?

Thomas Joo challenges the free-culture movement’s assertions both theoretically and empirically. He analyzes the infamous lawsuits and finds only reinforcement of a longstanding status quo. He provides extensive evidence that commercial hip-hop artists of the “golden age” (the 1980s and early 1990s) were perfectly aware of the requirement that they license their samples, and that they were able to produce and profit from their music nonetheless.

Art and architecture critic Hal Foster coined the term “recoding” to refer to sampling, remixing, mashups, quotation and all other forms of artistic appropriation. This is a useful word — while the various practices it subsumes differ technically, they spring from the same creative impulse and are treated similarly under the law. Joo does some sly recoding of his own when he subtitles one of the sections of his paper “More Samples, More Problems?” in homage to “Mo Money Mo Problems.”

Sampling lawsuits go back to the earliest days of hip-hop

Lawsuits over unauthorized use of copyrighted material in hip-hop hardly began in the 1990s; they go back at least as far as 1979, when Nile Rodgers and Bernard Edwards successfully sued the Sugarhill Gang for their appropriation of “Good Times.” Joo provides a valuable service by debunking the sampling lawsuit mythology. However, he goes too far on the other side, casting doubt on the basic validity and worth of remixing and sampling pop culture.

Joo is skeptical of claims made by Lessig and others that that relaxing copyright rules would advance semiotic democracy:

Law and technology facilitating recoding not only help independent record labels and artists question the cultural meanings advanced by major record companies; they also allow the latter to appropriate from the former. Moreover, recoding not only creates new meanings from existing cultural materials, but also repeats and reinforces those dominant cultural meanings. Indeed, by creating alternative meanings for dominant cultural materials such as popular music, recoding can contribute to their commercial appeal and cultural influence… Not all borrowing of cultural products constitutes autonomous meaning-making by individuals. For example, permitting recoding without copyright permission enables individuals to freely appropriate from the powerful culture industries, but it also enables appropriation in the reverse direction. Furthermore, individuals who recode may assign new meanings to dominant cultural products, but they cannot easily displace the existing meanings. Thus recoding re-disseminates those existing meanings and reaffirms their importance.

This is a thought-provoking claim, but one that I ultimately find unconvincing.

Is compulsory licensing the answer?

Some free culture people advocate for the institution of a compulsory licensing scheme for sampling, similar to the longstanding system for covering other artists’ compositions. Joo does not consider this a reasonable solution. He favors the current situation, where copyright owners can set whatever licensing terms and prices that they see fit, or refuse to grant licenses at all. Joo believes that a creator’s right to control the meaning and interpretation of their work deserves protection more than the right of others to recode that work. He sees compulsory licensing of sampling as an effective subsidy for samplers. The market presently sets licensing fees, and a mandated licensing scheme would keep the prices artificially low. Joo questions whether such a de facto subsidy of sampling is worthwhile:

[T]he tension between legal restrictions and creative energy can be a productive one. After all, copyright law does not constitute a prohibition on cultural appropriation: it merely assigns it a price, just as every aspect of artistic production, from guitars to paintbrushes, has a price. Sampling in hip-hop, like earlier kinds of musical borrowing, did not develop in some mythical golden age in which intellectual property was unregulated.

Joo observes that hip-hop pioneers like DJ Kool Herc managed to recode copyrighted works at for-profit dance parties under a copyright regime essentially identical to the one that exists today. This glosses over an important distinction, however. Herc and his peers were operating outside of the law, not in compliance with it. A venue is supposed to pay a blanket license to the rights management organizations covering whatever songs get played by DJs, the jukebox or live bands. But that license doesn’t extend to the extensive alterations that hip-hop turntablists make to recorded works. Also, block parties tend not to pay blanket license fees. Joo equates not being punished with having the tacit blessing of the law.

Did the Biz Markie lawsuit end the golden age of sampling?

The greatest strength of Joo’s paper is his clarification of the widely misunderstood decision in the Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records. The case resulted in a Biz Markie album being pulled from store shelves due to an unlicensed sample from “Alone Again” by Gilbert O’Sullivan.

Free culture advocates point to this case as having imposed a new legal sanction on unlicensed sampling that hadn’t previously existed. The story goes that before Grand Upright, hip-hop and electronica artists were free to sample at will; after Grand Upright, only the biggest stars could afford to use samples. Joo points out that this is a gross misreading of the decision. Biz Markie and his label were perfectly aware that they were required to obtain permission for all of their sample usage, and that they had failed to obtain such permission for the Gilbert O’Sullivan sample. The only issue in the case was over who precisely owned the copright to “Alone Again,” and whether the injunction ordering the album removed from stores was an appropriate remedy.

So are you allowed to sample without permission or not?

The law regarding sampling copyrighted recordings is unclear. Prior to the Biz Markie case, music labels worked out ad-hoc arrangements, setting prices and reaching agreements according to the specific situation. It’s possible that Biz Markie and other golden age hip-hop artists could have put forward a Fair Use argument for not having to pay for samples at all, so long as their use was sufficiently transformative as to constitute a commentary on or parody of the original work. But this isn’t what artists did; most recognizable samples got cleared, and those artists who didn’t seek permission knew they were at risk of a lawsuit. While sample licenses may have been costly, Joo sees that cost as belonging to the same category as the cost of recording studios, engineers, marketing, distribution and so on.

Joo is less persuasive in his analysis of Double Dee and Steinski‘s 1983 track, “Lesson 1 – The Payoff Mix,” which is comprised entirely of well-known copyrighted songs, along with movie and TV quotes, spliced together from analog tape.

This track and its followups were enormously influential on sample-based producers. Steinski and Double Dee neither sought nor obtained permission to use any of their samples, and never released their proto-mashups commercially. Nevertheless, their work was widely heard and imitated. Joo takes this as evidence that copyright law didn’t hinder creative recoding. However, he misses a key point. The “Lesson” mashups became famous because they were widely played by DJs on commercial radio and in clubs, quite illegally. The fact that Double Dee, Steinski, the clubs and radio stations all escaped legal sanction is their good luck, not a sign of the culture’s broader tolerance for such copyright violations.

Joo is on firmer ground when he observes that several classic sample-heavy hip-hop records were made using licensed samples, including the Beastie Boys’ Paul’s Boutique and De La Soul’s 3 Feet High and Rising. While the license fees for both albums were considerable, that didn’t keep them from turning substantial profits. Joo also points to the example of Public Enemy, who expressed defiance of the law in their lyrics but nevertheless licensed their more recognizable samples. Public Enemy frontman Chuck D has himself brought two infringement suits for unauthorized sampling of his voice.

The conventional wisdom is that hip-hop producers were forced to abandon the dense collage method favored by Public Enemy and De La Soul for fear of lawsuits. Joo points out that this was more likely a consequence of hip-hop gaining a higher profile and becoming more profitable, resulting in copyright holders raising their clearance fees — a simple matter of supply and demand. Furthermore, Joo believes that the collage technique may simply have become passé. While many hip-hop fans would disagree, this argument can’t be dismissed out of hand.

Girl Talk and Fair Use

The law on sampling continues to be confusing and contradictory, with some courts finding that use of very short samples doesn’t violate copyright law, while others finding that any use of a copyrighted recording whatsoever is a violation. The Fair Use exception to copyright law isn’t universally recognized, though Joo considers it to be a good enough shelter for sampling artists from unfair prosecution. He cites Greg “Girl Talk” Gillis, whose work consists entirely of highly recognizable pop samples. Girl Talk samples with no permission whatsoever, invoking Fair Use to justify his practices. So far, no one has taken action against him, but this is probably not due to the robustness of Fair Use as a legal argument. Copyright attorney Martin Schwimmer once told me that no one will ever sue Girl Talk, regardless of the legal issues, because it would be a losing proposition. Girl Talk would be a highly sympathetic defendent, since he’s white and well-educated, with a fervent online following. (Martin Schwimmer himself is a fan.) If Girl Talk is successfully sued, the internet will rise up in protest, resulting in a public relations disaster that would cost the copyright holder far more than they’d win in a settlement. If the hypothetical copyright holder brought a case and lost, it would open the floodgates to unlicensed sampling. Rights holders prefer the status quo, where the law is murky and people mostly license their samples to be on the safe side.

Copyright owners and creators aren’t necessarily the same people

Joo is too quick to overlook the absurdities of copyright law as it stands. He notes approvingly that in the case Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, the interests of a less-wealthy and powerful musician (George Clinton) prevailed over those of two wealthier and more-powerful entities (NWA and Dimension Films.) However, this isn’t quite accurate. George Clinton had sold his copyrights long before the case, in an ill-considered business decision. The winner of the Bridgeport case was Bridgeport Music, a company that buys up copyrights and profits from licensing them. George Clinton didn’t benefit from Bridgeport’s lawsuit at all. In fact, Clinton is outspoken in his enthusiasm for sampling of his work.

Sample licenses are getting expensive

As hip-hop and electronic dance music have become more commercially successful and culturally prominent, rights holders have recognized the value of samples and have raised their license fees accordingly. Free culture advocates and hip-hop lovers alike complain that presently, the only way to make collage-like works from pop music is to either skirt the law or pay exorbitant sums of money. In their book Creative License: The Law And Culture Of Digital Sampling, Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola calculated that if Paul’s Boutique were made today, the sample licenses would result in almost twenty million dollars in losses on 2.5 million copies sold. The members of Public Enemy complain that their albums can’t be reissued because of the prohibitive licensing costs. Joo is unconvinced that the price of sample licenses is too high, and argues against a compulsory licensing scheme.

By limiting a copyright owner‘s control over derivative works and allowing users to simply take and pay, a compulsory licensing regime would likely lower users‘ costs. But it would externalize and subsidize users‘ costs; it would not necessarily lower costs overall. A compulsory licensing regime would constitute a subsidy of users at public expense–i.e., the considerable expense of administering such a regime.

His concern here seems overblown; after all, a similar argument could be made against compulsory licensing for compositions, but that system has worked well enough for a hundred years.

Is sampling good for society?

The fundamental question underlying all of the copyright controversies is this: should we place a higher value on the right of a copyright holder to control the use of their work, or the right of everyone else to recode that work? Joo is unequivocal in siding with the copyright holders. “Even assuming recoding advances semiotic democracy, subsidizing any method of cultural production can do so.” This argument too glibly equates all forms of artistic expression, however. In the media-saturated world we inhabit, I would argue that recoding of that media is a much more important right than the ability to compose new string quartets or bebop heads. It’s exactly the controversial nature of recoded works that makes them culturally valuable.

Not only is Joo unconvinced that recoding has special value; he thinks it may actually be harmful to semiotic democracy by reinforcing the hegemony of the corporate-produced media. He quotes Hal Foster: “Capitalism welcomes recoding, incorporates it, and co-opts it: such has been the fate of nearly every youth subculture based on recoding, from rock ‘n‘ roll to punk to hip-hop.” This is true, but both Foster and Joo neglect the time lag factor. Capitalism only appropriates recoding movements once they are widely established and no longer dangerous. Coca-Cola can visibly sponsor Jazz At Lincoln Center because it has been many decades since anyone found jazz to be controversial or threatening. Similarly, cruise lines wouldn’t use Iggy Pop’s “Lust For Life” in their ads if the song was still widely associated with heroin use, as it was when it was first released.

Joo is quite mistaken when he says that “[t]he mere act of recoding pop culture is no longer by itself an important or novel artistic statement.” This may be true in certain circles, but is by no means a valid generalization. Musicians, fans and critics remain deeply divided over the merits and ethics of sampling, many decades after it has become a commonplace. Recoding can even provoke vehement rage. Still, Joo does not believe that this controversy is reason enough to be protective of recoding.

Lowering the cost of recoding could retard semiotic democracy in that it would subsidize not only the semiotically weak and resource-poor, but also the most culturally influential members of society. Given the greater resources and distribution networks of established media corporations, their recodings are likely to have more cultural influence than those of less powerful speakers.

The problem with this argument is that it already describes the status quo. For example, Disney is notorious for appropriating public-domain folk tales, and then vigorously suing anyone who appropriates their works.

Does hip-hop need sampling?

Joo questions hip-hop essentialists who maintain that recoding is fundamental to the art form: “Sampling is… neither necessary to nor specific to hip-hop music.” He invokes the Beastie Boys, OutKast and the Roots as hip-hop artists who play conventional instruments. He neglects to mention, however, that these artists also sample and quote extensively. Ahmir “Questlove” Thompson of the Roots is a world-class drummer, but he nevertheless sometimes uses sampled breakbeats in his productions rather than playing live drums. And while Joo further tries to weaken the connection between hip-hop and recoding by mentioning its roots in spoken-word poetry, he neglects to mention that rappers “sample” other songs by quoting them continually, and sometimes run afoul of copyright law as a result. For instance, Slick Rick and Doug E. Fresh quoted the Beatles’ “Michelle” in the original version of “The Show.” They were forced to remove the line by EMI in subsequent pressings.

Joo is sanguine that the restrictions imposed by clearance costs stimulate new forms of creativity. For example, he cites DJ Shadow, who uses unlicensed samples that are too fragmentary or obscure to be litigated over. But flying below the legal radar is not the same thing as cultural approbation. Joo also gives a poor example with M.I.A.‘s 2007 hit, “Paper Planes.” He commends her for using samples of gunshots and a ringing cash register rather than recoded pop, while neglecting to mention that a looped sample of the Pixies runs throughout the entire song, and that the chorus’ structure references Wreckz-N-Effect.

Joo is right to point out that that the stereotype of hip-hop’s pioneers as disenfranchised and poor is a gross oversimplification. From the beginning, hip-hop artists have come from a diversity of class backgrounds. Joo is also correct that in the 1980s, samplers were expensive machines limited to the technological elite. However, once again, he goes too far in puncturing the hip-hop creation myth. Artists who did not have access to digital samplers used whatever means were available to them to do their recoding. Q-Tip of A Tribe Called Quest reminisces in the documentary Beats, Rhymes And Life about making painstaking “pause tapes,” a process that took hours to produce a few minutes of a looped sample.

Sampling musicians turn music listening into a conversation

Just as recording was a novel art form a hundred years ago, so too is sampling today. The ability to sample and remix recordings changes them from passive media to interactive media. Joo undervalues this transformation, and the art of sampling generally: “[S]amples are valuable to music producers because they offer a way to obtain the sound of a musician without employing any musicians.” This betrays Joo’s aesthetic preconceptions. Sampling musicians are still musicians. Creative sample use requires as much skill and practice as creative violin or piano playing. When Joo equates sampling with “automated production methods in other industries,” he shows ignorance of the human choices that comprise the sampling process. Furthermore, Joo undervalues the power of recoding to reshape the meaning of source material: “Even the most active engagements with texts, such as the production of innovative derivative works, involve at least some ceding of the meaning-making function to the author of the source work.” This is demonstrably untrue; it is quite possible for a recoded work to be significantly greater than the sum of its parts. For example, the song “They Reminisce Over You” by Pete Rock and C.L. Smooth turns samples of a lite-jazz recording of a Jefferson airplane song into the basis of an elegaic tribute to a friend who died young. Pete Rock and C.L. Smooth turn trite and banal source material into a powerfully moving work.

Joo continues to be inaccurate in his analysis of the Grey Album, a mashup of the Beatles’ White Album and Jay-Z’s Black Album created by the producer Danger Mouse. Joo maintains that Danger Mouse “never stood a serious chance of contesting the cultural meaning of the Beatles‘ White Album or Jay-Z‘s Black Album.” I myself am proof that this is untrue. I was indifferent to Jay-Z until I heard his music combined with Beatles songs that I knew and loved intimately. The Grey Album acted as a cultural ambassador, opening me up not only to Jay-Z but to many other hip-hop artists as well. Jay-Z is well aware of this effect, and releases his albums in remix-friendly acapella versions with the outspoken hope that people will do exactly what Danger Mouse did.

When Joo says that recoding corporate-created cultural commodities only further cements their hegemony, he conflates the terms “corporate-created” with “corporate-owned.” EMI may own the Beatles’ copyrights, but the Beatles aren’t a corporate entity. (They tried to become one in the late 1960s with their Apple company, and failed spectacularly.) When Danger Mouse recodes the Beatles, he is engaging in a dialog with four musicians, not the faceless corporation who happens to own their copyrights. Joo is eager to convince us that consumption of corporate-produced pop music is no different politically than consumption of corporate-produced sneakers. This is a gross misunderstanding of the musical experience. I may purchase Beatles or Jay-Z recordings, but I don’t “consume” those recordings. I have close and ongoing emotional relationships with them, I study them and remix them, imitate them and react against them. I have no such intellectual discourse with my sneakers. Recoding has made my formerly one-sided relationship with recordings into a dialog, whether that means arranging “Dear Prudence” for a jazz octet or mashing it up with a Michael Jackson song.

Joo’s misunderstanding of the music-listening experience extends to the music production process. He observes that “[l]ike commercial pop hits, the very technology of digital sampling consists of commodities sold by corporations.” This is a facile and meaningless comparison. Some music production is indeed sold by large and powerful corporate entities (like Apple’s Logic); some is sold by small, independent companies (like Ableton Live); and some is given away for free on the Internet (like Audacity and ChucK.) Joo is even more mistaken that it’s impossible to assert ownership over mass-market entertainment. “Because media culture is a product we consume rather than make (at least not entirely), it is not entirely our culture.” This is exactly why it’s so important that we have a right to recode it. Joo draws a false equivalency between “watching television, writing fan fiction, or remixing a hit pop song” as “merely guilty pleasures, more like eating junk food, drinking beer, or driving a big car, and less like meaningful expressive or political activity worthy of special legal concern.” I’m inclined to agree with him about watching TV, but he’s utterly wrong about remixing (and fan fiction.) Writing generic classical or jazz melodies requires significantly less effort for me than a creative remix. There’s no comparison to be made with watching television or eating junk food.

I agree with Joo that the health of semiotic democracy depends on many factors besides copyright law. And I appreciate his effort to puncture the mythology of the free-culture movement. However, his own counterarguments are oversimplified as well, and he doesn’t value recoding highly enough. The free-culture movement may not have its facts in order, but its political heart is in the right place.